Tag Archives: first-order logic

Naïve set theory

This post is sort of a translation and a follow-up of a post in Spanish about the comparison between naïve and axiomatic set theory.

The point I made in the previous post is that

One leaves naïve set theory in the moment that first order logic (FOL) gets explicit.

Or, from a different perspective, when you realize in full the possibility of different models of set theory.
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Teoría de conjuntos ingenua

Abstract. I’ll discuss one view of the naïve-axiomatic dichotomy in Set Theory. My claim is that one leaves the “naïve” world when first order logic (or put differently, the possibility of different models of ZFC) becomes explicit.

En muchas ocasiones se utiliza el término teoría de conjuntos ingenua; incluso el libro de Halmos [1] se llama así.

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